The Brussels dialogue did not resolve the Kosovo-Serbia sta- tus dispute, but it did solve a number of concrete problems and laid out some critical foundations for negotiating a comprehensive normalization agreement. Belgrade and Pristina face a series of choices in how they want their relations to be and with each choice come both benefits and costs. The international community is searching for a win-win solution.

The Kosovo-Serbia dialogue is a relatively success story. Perhaps not if looking at it in isolation, as it could have certainly been done more, better, and faster, and so the criticism to the process is often founded. But if we compare it with other conflicts of similar nature or 'frozen conflicts, this is a good case: the dialogue helped transform the Kosovo-Serbia conflict from 'a frozen conflict into a melting one."

And unlike other frozen conflicts, the Kosovo-Serbia dispute is rather interesting and at times entertaining. We have two entities that do not recognize each other, do not seem to like each other very much, but are very interested in becoming friends-or at least pretend to become friends-because they want to join this exclusive club called European Union, and this club no longer accepts new members with open disputes

Pristina and Belgrade have some solid political will and a lot of self-interest in becoming friends, at least formally. Now they have to figure out a way to resolve their disputes, a way that ideally satisfies both sides. The core issue is status. The Brussels dialogue rather successfully kept it under the carpet, but now it is becoming increasingly clear that no new process can progress without addressing the status head-on.

Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic said that an easy fix would be recognition, but added that he will not do it. He has said many times that he will submit the case to the will of the people. Polls show that "the will of the people in Serbia and Kosovo does not support a breakthrough agreement that requires some bold compromises. So if an easy-fix' is not on the table, what would be a 'non-easy fix? Serbian officials say "everything but recognition." For Kosovo, there is 'no fix without recognition. The United States supports a solution with recognition. The European Union supports an agreement that concludes the conflict, but does not explicitly mention recognition, mostly because five of its members do not recognize Kosovo.

Serbian politicians say that the final deal should be some kind of a trade. Belgrade has something-recognition-that Pristina finds very valuable, and Belgrade has made it clear that it will not give it to Pristina for free. It wants something equally valuable in return. So if Kosovo gets recognition what can Serbia get? EU membership is mentioned most frequently. But Belgrade's favorite option seems to be a 'land for recognition option, whereby Serbia acquires Kosovo's four Serb-dominated municipalities in the north-about 12 percent of Kosovo's territory-but most of the international community opposes this option.

If a final agreement is not reachable, some suggest another intermediate deal-a type of a Brussels Agreement II. Among others, such an agreement would offer Serbia a fast-track EU membership and offer Kosovo membership in the UN. Kosovo feels that the UN membership would bring security guar antees that Serbia would not try to take Kosovo back in some hypothetical distant future scenario. But bringing on board other permanent UN Security Council members, especially Russia, is close to impossible.

Both Pristina and Belgrade agree that it is in their self-interest to find a solution. But there is currently a conflict between their present self-interest and long-term 'national interest," which both sides are having trouble to balance. Many argue that it is in Serbia's self-interest to conclude the Kosovo conflict through some form of relinquishment, but that would contradict the 'national interest' which holds that "Kosovo is an inseparable part of Serbia," and would probably make angry more people than the leadership can afford. On the other hand, many argue that it is in Kosovo's self-interest to agree to some form of 'normalization without recognition, but that would contradict its 'national interest of being legally recognized by the state it seceded from, and again, would probably make more people angry that the leadership in Pristina can afford. So it remains to be seen whether present self-interests will prevail over the old 'national interest', or the other way around. As this paper shows, present self-interest did prevail in the Brussels dialogue to a solid degree.

One of the biggest tangible self-interest is the economic benefit, especially for Serbia but also for Kosovo. On per capita bases, Kosovo is Serbia first import partner. A Kosovar imports about €150 euros per year from Serbia, and only about 50 from Albania, for instance. By comparison, a Russian imports only about €5 euros form Serbia. Or an Italian, Italy is the biggest importer of Serbian goods, imports only about 40 euros of Serbian goods. Normalization of relations would allow Serbia to preserve and to even expand its exports to Kosovo.

For Kosovo, Serbia used to be the main market until the war disrupted it. But now that many technical and political hurdles have been cleared off and Kosovo can again export to Serbia, it could reclaim some of the market share. For instance, Kosovo produces about 50 million liters of wine and brandy, and Serbia could become an attractive market for such produce.

However, non-economic factors such as identity and 'national interests’, as defined centuries ago, will remain powerful forces in determining the shape of a solution.

Even though Belgrade and Pristina do not yet agree on a solution, they do recognize the cost that the continuation of the conflict inflicts on both sides. The process is being prolonged also because Serbs and Albanians have very little experience in give-and-take and bargaining with each other. For the first time in the history of their relations, they are negotiating and signing agreements. But Pristina and Belgrade remain reluctant to advance beyond a comfortable position and take the risks required to reach a solution. Also, the constituencies in Serbia and Kosovo are not quite in the mood for some fundamental change in their relations, and they remain vulnerable to a lot of disinformation about the negotiations and an eventual compromise. As we have seen with the Brussels process, once the peoples' faith in dialogue is undermined, the dialogue stops working.

The conclusion of the conflict through some kind of peace agreement, unthinkable just a few years ago, is becoming inevitable though. And since the status quo is not favorable to either side, it is rational to expect that the political leaders will accept terms that might not be popular with their constituencies in the short term, but that would gain popularity once the benefits of the solution begin to become visible. The solution will be determined by all kinds of factors but the most important is the willingness for peace of the leaders in charge.